Game Theory for Social Interaction — one-line
Game theory = people making interdependent choices; apply it to conversations to predict likely responses and design moves that create cooperative, high-value outcomes (dates, rapport, respect) instead of accidental conflicts.
1) Core concepts (simple & social)
Players: you and the other person (and sometimes group).
Actions / strategies: what each can choose (ask → yes/no; tease → reciprocate).
Payoffs: perceived value of outcomes (fun, status, comfort).
Nash equilibrium: a strategy pair where no one gains by unilaterally changing.
Dominant strategy: best choice regardless of opponent.
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): cooperation vs defection tradeoff — explains trust/risk in early flirting.
Coordination games & focal points: choosing compatible options (place/time).
Signalling & costly signals: actions that credibly reveal hidden qualities (punctuality, planning).
Repeated games / shadow of the future: interactions repeated over time — cooperation becomes rational.
Mixed strategies: randomize sometimes to be unpredictable (but use sparingly).
Tit-for-tat: mirror cooperative but forgive — great for building trust.
Cheap talk: words without commitment — useful, but verify with actions.
2) Why Game Theory helps in flirting/convos (psych + neuro)
Predictability: you can anticipate responses & avoid traps (reactance, embarrassment).
Trust mechanics: PD shows why small early cooperations build future trust (oxytocin, PFC engagement).
Reward optimization: choose actions that maximize long-run social payoff not instant dopamine hit.
Reduced conflict: design communication rules (coordination) that avoid mismatch.
Cognitive ease: simple strategy rules reduce overthinking under social stress (limits amygdala).
Ethics: models are tools — never use to coerce, deceive, or manipulate people’s agency.
3) Simple social payoff models (concrete examples)
A — Two-move flirt matrix (basic)
You can Ask (A) or Not ask (N); they can Say Yes (Y) or No (X).
They: Y (accept) They: X (reject)
You: A You +5, They +4 You -2, They -1
You: N You 0, They 0 You 0, They 0
Interpretation: asking risks -2 if rejected but big +5 if accepted. Decision depends on estimated probability of Y. If P(Y) > 2/7 (~29%) ask wins expected value.
Quick rule: estimate likelihood; if >30% say ask (low-cost ask). Use dual-leverage to increase P(Y).
B — Prisoner’s Dilemma style (trust test)
You and they can Cooperate (C: open, honest) or Defect (D: play cold / tease to test).
Typical payoffs (social):
Both C: mutual rapport (+4, +4) — best joint outcome.
One C, other D: defector gains short-term control (+5), cooperator loses trust (-3).
Both D: awkward stalemate (0,0).
Lesson: in one-off interactions defection may tempt; but repeated games reward cooperation. Use small cooperative moves (micro-value) to signal C.
4) Tactical toolbox (How to use models in real time)
1) Calculate a quick EV (very fast)
Estimate P(success) with 3 cues (tone, eye contact, history). If P > threshold (often 25–35%), take low-cost action.
2) Use Commitment Devices
Make a small public commitment to increase credibility. Example: “I’ll be there at 4 — I’ll text if anything changes.” (credible, increases their trust)
3) Offer Dual-Leverage (A/B choices)
Instead of “Wanna meet?” say: “Coffee 20m after class or a study swap 30m — which?” Both are wins; increases chance of Yes and creates coordination (Schelling point).
4) Signal Costly Traits
Punctuality, small planning, modest investments (bringing printed notes, booking a seat) are costly signals that boost perceived value.
5) Tit-for-Tat (soft)
Mirror tone/effort: match their warmth, forgive one-off mistakes — encourages cooperation. Don’t escalate retaliation.
6) Use Reputation & Repeated Game Thinking
If you’ll interact often (same class/college), treat every small action as part of long game — invest in cooperation.
7) Avoid brinkmanship in social contexts
Don’t play extreme tests (jealousy games) because social cost is high and equilibrium often breaks to both lose.
5) Scripts mapped to game moves (copy-paste ready)
Openers that increase cooperation probability
1. “Quick question — 2 options: coffee after class or a short study swap this weekend? Which works?” (A/B choice = coordination)
2. “I made a 1-page summary — sharing with two people first, want in?” (social proof + scarcity)
3. “Short favour — can you check one line in my code? I’ll buy chai.” (reciprocity signal + low cost)
Signalling / Commitment
4. “I’ll be at the library steps at 4. If you want to stop by, say 3:45.” (sets expectation)
5. “I don’t do vague plans — quick 20-min yes/no?” (boundary = clarity)
Tit-for-tat / repair
6. If they tease you lightly: mirror then forgive — “Haha, fair — your move next time.” (playful reciprocal)
7. If tension: “I didn’t mean to come off like that — want to restart?” (cooperative repair)
6) Advanced models & tactics
A — Mixed strategies (when to randomize)
If your behavior is being exploited (someone always defects), randomize small things (time you reply, small invites) so you aren’t predictable—keeps them from gaming you. Use sparingly; heavy randomness undermines trust.
B — Signalling theory (costly signals)
Design signals that are hard to fake: consistent punctuality, showing up for small things, introducing them to trusted friends. These create long-term trust and shift equilibria toward cooperation.
C — Mechanism design (setup the game)
You can structure interaction to make cooperation the dominant strategy: e.g., propose a low-cost test with immediate mutual benefit (study group with shared notes) — everyone’s best move is to participate.
D — Evolutionary / Population thinking
Observe social norms in group; imitate successful strategies (not slavishly) and adapt. If the group values directness, adjust; if it values subtlety, signal subtly.
E — Bayesian games / information asymmetry
People often have private information (true interest). Use small costly probes to elicit info (e.g., ask a question requiring effort). Interpret answers as signals; update beliefs (Bayesian updating).
7) Repeated games & reputation (practical rules)
Shadow of the future: more interactions → more cooperation. Treat campus/college relationships as repeated games.
Start cooperative: small friendly moves, low-cost favors.
Don’t exploit early trust; repay it.
Correct deviations quickly but politely (tit-for-tat + forgiveness).
If someone defects repeatedly, change equilibrium by reducing cooperation or exiting.
8) Coordination & Schelling points (practical examples)
Use culturally obvious meeting spots as focal points — easier coordination.
Offer times that are natural (after class, before labs) — higher probability of agreement.
Use small defaults: “I’ll book 4pm unless you prefer otherwise.” Defaults increase acceptance.
9) Drills — Beginner → Advanced
Beginner (Days 1–14)
Read payoff cues: in 20 interactions, estimate P(success) before asking. Record result.
Practice A/B invites — aim for 20 sends: compare acceptance rates.
Intermediate (Days 15–45)
Tit-for-tat practice: mirror warmth for 2 turns; forgive once. Log how many reciprocate cooperation.
Signalling test: perform 5 small costly signals (arrive early, bring summary) and record change in responses.
Advanced (Days 46–90)
Design a mechanism: run a weekly study group with a clear small commitment — measure turnout and repeated attendance (build reputation).
Mixed strategies: when someone exploits patterns, practice subtle randomization and observe whether exploitation reduces.
10) KPIs & metrics to track progress
Micro-yes rate: % of low-cost asks that succeed (aim 40%+).
Conversion to 2nd meet: % of first meet → second meet (aim 20%+ initially).
Cooperation index: % of interactions where both parties show cooperative move (reciprocity, engagement).
Defection incidents: times someone defects (ghosts, rude) — track and escalate.
Reputation growth: number of new genuine introductions per month.
Record in simple spreadsheet: date | person | action | predicted P | actual outcome | follow-up.
11) Common pitfalls & fixes
Over-gambling (too many tests): leads to fatigue — fix: limit "tests" to low frequency.
Jealousy / brinkmanship: high cost; avoid as it breaks cooperation.
Predictability trap: being too predictable lets others exploit — mix small randomness.
Mismatched frames: you framed as casual, they wanted serious → coordinate frame first.
Weaponizing game theory: using it to manipulate emotions (gaslighting, jealousy) is unethical — don’t do it.
12) Ethics & consent (non-negotiable)
Use game theory to increase mutual value, not to coerce.
Avoid strategies that intentionally create anxiety (intermittent reinforcement, fake scarcity).
If a person is vulnerable, prioritize care over strategic gain.
Full transparency if stakes high (relationship decisions).
13) Quick cheat-sheet (one minute before approach)
1. Who’s the player(s)?
2. What are 2 plausible actions each can take?
3. Quick estimate: P(success) (low/med/high) using 3 cues.
4. Choose low-cost cooperative action if P≥threshold (≈30%).
5. Offer A/B choice to increase P and coordinate.
6. Signal credibility with a small costly action if relationship repeats.
7. If defection occurs repeatedly → reduce cooperation or exit.
Memorable: “Design the game so the right move is easy.”
14) Example flows (3 short flows)
Flow 1 — Cold DM → Meet (coordination + signaling)
Observe: profile hints shared interests; recent story shows openness.
Decide: A/B low-cost invite with small signal.
Message: “Two quick options — coffee 20m after class (quick) or rooftop music swap Sat 6 (chill). I’ll bring my 1-page on the topic. Which works?”
Why: A/B choice + micro-value (notes) + signal (will bring summary).
Flow 2 — Someone teases / tests (PD style)
They test with light coldness.
Move: tit-for-tat softly + probe. “Haha — testing me? If you want to be serious, let’s be direct.”
Why: mirrors, then invites cooperation; avoids escalation.
Flow 3 — Group coordination (mechanism design)
You want a study group that includes them.
Post: “Study swap — 4–5 people, rooftop, 45m. Limited to 6 because small helps focus. Want me to save you a spot?”
Why: honest scarcity + coordination + focal point.
15) 60-day mastery plan (concise)
Phase 1 (Days 1–14): Learn basics; practice A/B invites; log P estimates.
Phase 2 (Days 15–35): Build reputation via small costly signals and tit-for-tat reciprocity. Run 1 study meetup.
Phase 3 (Days 36–60): Mechanism design: host recurring micro-events; measure cooperation, conversions; refine scripts.
16) Final mindset (Ved, INTJ edge)
Game theory is system design for humans. Your INTJ strengths — pattern detection, strategic thinking, and calm execution — will make this natural. Use it to create cooperative environments, design low-friction choices, and grow reputation over time. Always keep ethics front and center — the best equilibria are the ones where both players get lasting value.
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